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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee, 
v. 
WILLIAM MICHAEL EDWARDS, 
Appellant. 
: Case No. 970128-CA 
: Priority No. 2 (incarcerated) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's 
jurisdiction over this appeal from a criminal case involving a 
conviction less than a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Did the trial court abuse his discretion in denying Mr. 
Edwards' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review applicable to denials of motions to 
withdraw guilty pleas is set forth in State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 
430 (Utah 1996), as follows: 
[The Court reviews] a trial court's denial of a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea under an "abuse of 
discretion" standard, incorporating the "clearly 
erroneous" standard for the trial court's findings of 
fact made in conjunction with that decision. However, 
the ultimate question of whether the trial court 
strictly complied with constitutional and procedural 
requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a 
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of 
a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed 
for correctness. 
Id. at 433 (citations omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
Mr. Edwards preserved the issue in the district court, when 
he moved to withdraw his guilty pleas and filed a memorandum in 
support of his motion (R. 15-20). He filed a supplemental 
memorandum in support of his motion to withdraw (R. 2 9-3 6)# and a 
reply memorandum to the State's memorandum opposing withdrawal of 
the pleas (R. 45-52). After a full evidentiary hearing (R. 191-
232), the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the pleas (R. 
59-61, 80-82). Mr. Edwards filed a petition for interlocutory 
review, and this Court denied the petition (R. 87). Mr. Edwards 
also briefed the issue in his motion for a certificate of 
probable cause filed in the trial court (R. 92-99). He also 
briefed the issue in moving for a certificate of probable cause 
before this Court, which denied the motion over the dissent of 
Judge Orme (R'. Ill) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES 
The following statutory and constitutional provisions and 
rules pertain to this appeal, and are reproduced in full in the 
addendum: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1 
Utah Code Ann. section 41-6-44 (1996) 
Utah Code Ann. section 53-3-220 (1994) 
Utah Code Ann. section 58-3 7-8 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-204 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-13-6 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. DISPOSITION 
The State of Utah charged Mr. Edwards with one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8, and with one count 
of driving under the influence, a class B misdemeanor violation 
of Utah Code Ann. section 41-6-44, for events which allegedly 
occurred on May 26, 1996 (R. 4-5). At the first appearance on 
June 10, 1996, before Judge Dever, Mr. Edwards informed the court 
that J. Franklin Allred would represent him; however, Mr. Allred 
informed the court on June 25, 1996, that Allred had not been 
retained (R. 85). The preliminary hearing was originally set for 
July 10, 1996 (R. 83), but was continued for ten days by Justice 
of the Peace William E. Pitt, in order for Mr. Edwards to find an 
attorney (R. 85). On July 17, 1996, the preliminary hearing was 
set for August 7, 1996 (R. 38, 85) . 
On August 7, 1996, Mr. Edwards appeared without counsel and 
pled guilty as charged before Judge Rokich (R. 6 through 14). 
A copy of his plea affidavit and the transcript of the plea 
colloquy are in the addendum to this brief.1 
On September 3, 1996, after Mr. Edwards retained J. Franklin 
Allred to represent him, Mr. Edwards moved to withdraw his guilty 
pleas (R. 15-20), and later supplemented the original memorandum 
1
 The transcript of the plea colloquy is mislabeled 
"preliminary hearing," and erroneously indicates that the hearing 
took place before Judge Pitt. 
3 
in support of the motion to withdraw the pleas (R. 2 9-36). The 
State opposed the motion to withdraw the pleas (R. 3 9-44), and 
Mr. Edwards filed a reply memorandum in support of withdrawal of 
the pleas (R. 45-52) . 
Counsel for Mr. Edwards moved to recuse Judge Rokich, and 
Judge Dever took over the case (R. 84). 
Following an evidentiary hearing before Judge Dever, the 
trial court denied the motion to withdraw the pleas (R. 191-233, 
59-61) . 
The trial court granted Mr. Edwards7 motion for a stay 
pending the outcome of Mr. Edwards' petition for interlocutory 
appeal to this Court, which petition this Court denied in case 
number 970028-CA (R. 68-69, 87). 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Edwards filed a motion for a 
certificate of probable cause, to stay any sentence to be imposed 
pending Mr. Edwards' direct appeal (R. 91-99) . 
On February 24, 1997, Judge Dever imposed and suspended a 
prison sentence of zero to five years for the possession 
conviction, and imposed and suspended a concurrent sentence of 
six months in jail for the DUI conviction, placing Mr. Edwards on 
probation (R. 106-107). As conditions of probation, Judge Dever 
ordered Mr. Edwards to serve 12 0 days in jail with work release, 
and fined Mr. Edwards $1,500 (R. 105). Judge Dever denied the 
motion for a certificate of probable cause (R. 102-103). 
Mr. Edwards filed a timely notice of appeal on March 4, 1997 
(R. 100-101). 
4 
This Court denied Mr. Edwards' motion for a certificate of 
probable cause, over the dissent of Judge Orme (R. Ill). This 
Court also denied Mr. Edwards7 motion for summary reversal of the 
trial court. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Before Judge Rokich, Mr. Edwards pled guilty as charged to 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and 
to driving under the influence, without having or waiving the 
assistance of counsel (R. 7-14, 121-127). 
The errors which occurred during and following the entry of 
the plea are numerous and substantial, and are detailed with 
proper citations to the record in the argument portion of this 
brief. 
During the proceedings on Mr. Edwards' motion to withdraw 
the guilty pleas before Judge Dever, the prosecution never 
articulated any prejudice it would suffer if the pleas were 
withdrawn. 
Judge Dever summarily denied the motion to withdraw the 
pleas in an order indicating that the pleas were knowingly and 
voluntarily entered (R. 81). 
A copy of the order is in the addendum to this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused his discretion in denying Mr. 
Edwards' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Numerous errors 
during and following the entry of the pleas render the pleas 
involuntary and require their withdrawal upon Mr. Edwards' 
5 
motion. 
The factors requiring withdrawal of the pleas, and discussed 
fully in the argument section of the brief include the illusory 
nature of the prosecutor's promise which induced Mr. Edwards to 
enter the pleas, the prosecutor's breach of the plea bargain, the 
absence of Mr. Edwards' waiver of his right to counsel prior to 
entering the plea without counsel, the absence of a factual basis 
for the pleas, the failure of the trial court to correctly 
identify the potential punishment for the DUI charge and 
consequences of both convictions, and the failure of the trial 
court to comply with Rule 11 in the entry of the pleas. 
The entry of the plea on the basis of the illusory plea 
bargain, the entry of the plea in violation of rule 11, and the 
breach of the plea agreement all violated Mr. Edwards' 
fundamental constitutional rights, including his rights to due 
process of law. See e.g. State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 670-
771 (Utah App. 1993); Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7; 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1. 
Particularly because the State never articulated any 
prejudice that would have occurred in the event of a withdrawal 
of the guilty pleas, the trial court's denial of Mr. Edwards' 
motion to withdraw constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
• The general law governing the presentence withdrawal of 
guilty pleas is stated in State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1987), as follows: 
6 
The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of 
several important constitutional rights, including the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to trial by jury, and the right to confront 
witnesses. Because the entry of such a plea 
constitutes such a waiver, and because the prosecution 
will generally be unable to show that it will suffer 
any significant prejudice if the plea is withdrawn, a 
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should in 
general, be liberally granted. 
Id. at 1041-42. 
In the instant matter, the State never articulated any 
prejudice, undue or otherwise, that would be caused by granting 
Mr. Edwards' presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
Under Gallegos, withdrawal would have been appropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-13-6 is the statute governing 
withdrawal of pleas. It states in full, 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any 
time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of 
the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest is made by motion and 
shall be made within 3 0 days after the entry 
of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of 
an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Given that Mr. Edwards' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas 
was made on September 3, 1996, after the pleas were entered on 
August 7, 1996, the motion was timely filed. Id. As the 
following discussion demonstrates, the motion for withdrawal of 




MR. EDWARDS7 FAILURES TO UNDERSTAND 
THE NATURE OF AND OBTAIN 
THE BENEFIT OF THE PLEA BARGAIN 
RENDER THE PLEAS INVOLUNTARY 
AND SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL. 
A. MR. EDWARDS' FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THE ILLUSORY PLEA BARGAIN 
ENTITLES HIM TO WITHDRAW THE PLEAS. 
Mr. Edwards agreed to plead guilty as charged in exchange 
for the prosecutor's promise to abstain from filing a charge of 
driving on revocation, as set forth in the plea agreement as 
follows: 
14. My pleas of guilty are the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. 
The promises, duties and provisions of this plea 
bargain, if any, are full [sic] set forth as follows: 
Upon my plea of guilty to Count 1 & 2 the state will 
not charge me with driving on Revocation, will 
recommend probation and not oppose a motion to reduce 
Count 1 to a class A misdemeanor upon completion of 
probation. 
(R. 10)(emphasis in original). 
At the time of his arrest in this matter, Mr. Edwards was 
not driving on a revoked license, and thus, the prosecutor had no 
basis for charging Mr. Edwards with driving on revocation (R. 
208) . 
The record establishes that the prosecutor misunderstanding 
of the value of the plea bargain. In his cross-examination of 
Mr. Edwards, the prosecutor implied that at the time of the entry 
of the plea bargain, the prosecutor believed that Mr. Edwards' 
license was revoked because the police officer who arrested Mr. 
Edwards had noted on the DUI citation that the citation would not 
serve as a temporary license due to Mr. Edwards' prior DUI (R. 
8 
215-216). In arguing against withdrawal of the pleas, the 
prosecutor argued that the prosecutor believed that Mr. Edwards' 
license was revoked when they entered into the plea agreement, 
and that he offered to abstain from filing the driving on 
revocation charge as an "incentive" for Mr. Edwards to plead 
guilty as charged (R. 229). 
Mr. Edwards did not understand the nature of the 
prosecutor's incentive for pleading guilty as charged --to 
abstain from charging Edwards with driving on revocation when the 
prosecutor had no basis for such a charge -- for Edwards would 
not have pled guilty as charged without expecting to receive 
something in exchange (R. 211).2 
Despite the trial court's admonition to the contrary,3 Mr. 
2
 Cf. State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988) ("To 
deny defendant relief on the merits, we would have to assume that 
he willingly bargained to plead guilty, expecting and receiving 
nothing in return. This assumption is highly speculative and 
implausible where a plea bargain is involved. The nature of plea 
bargains requires the exchange of consideration, allowing the 
parties involved to reach a mutually desirable agreement. A plea 
bargain is a contractual relationship in which consideration is 
passed. In fact, the remedy for a defendant where the State 
fails to fulfill its side of the bargain is frequently specific 
performance. A plea bargain does not involve a situation where a 
defendant willingly pleads guilty to a crime, neither asking nor 
expecting anything in return.") . 
3
 During the plea colloquy, the following discussion 
occurred, 
[THE COURT]: Now your plea must be unconditional. 
The fact that the State may make a recommendation 
doesn't necessarily mean that the Judge who imposes the 
sentence will follow those recommendations. It's got 
to be an unconditional plea. Do you understand that? 
Any question about it? 
[MR. EDWARDS]: No. 
[THE COURT]: IF YOU'RE NOT PLACED ON PROBATION 
9 
Edwards had the mistaken belief that by pleading guilty under the 
terms of the plea agreement, he would avoid the risks of being 
incarcerated and losing his license (R. 205). 
Mr. Edwards' belief that pleading guilty under the terms of 
the plea agreement would avert the possibilities of his 
incarceration and loss of his license was also a misunderstanding 
of the plea agreement, for regardless of the terms of plea 
agreement, by pleading guilty, Mr. Edwards risked being 
incarcerated for up to five years on the possession charge, and 
for up to six months on the DUI charge. See e.g. Utah Code Ann. 
sections 76-3-203 (stating potential incarceration terms for 
felonies) and 76-3-204 (stating potential incarceration terms for 
misdemeanors). Loss of his license was an administrative 
consequence of either conviction 'under Utah Code Ann. section 41-
6-44(11) (1996) and Utah Code Ann. section 53-3-220(1)(c)(i)(A) 
(1994) . 
Utah law is well established on this point: when one enters 
a guilty plea on the basis of an illusory or misunderstood 
promise by the prosecutor, the plea is not knowing and voluntary, 
and is subject to withdrawal. 
For instance, in State v. West, 765 P.2d 891 (Utah 1988), 
the court stated, 
YOU'RE NOT GOING TO COME BACK IN AND SAY, "WELL, THEY 
PROMISED ME I'D GET PROBATION?" 
[MR. EDWARDS]: (INAUDIBLE). 
[THE COURT]: SO AS LONG AS WE'VE GOT THAT CLEAR. ... 
(R. 122-123). 
10 
"[I]n order to plead voluntarily, a defendant must know 
the direct consequences of his plea, including the 
actual value of any commitments made to him. Where, as 
here, counsel's alleged advice, corroborated by the 
information supplied by the court, grossly exaggerated 
the benefit to be derived from the pleas of guilty, it 
would follow that the pleas were not voluntary." 
Id. at 896 (quoting United States v. Hammond. 528 F.2d 15, 19 
(4th Cir. 1975) . Accord, State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1274-
1275 (Utah 1988).4 
Because Mr. Edwards misunderstood the value of the 
prosecutor's inducement to enter the pleas, the pleas were 
involuntary and should have been withdrawn on Edwards' motion. 
Id. 
B. THE BREACHED PLEA AGREEMENT ENTITLES MR. EDWARDS TO WITHDRAW 
THE PLEAS. 
It was Mr. Edwards' understanding, expressed prior to 
sentencing and never contradicted by the prosecutor, that the 
prosecutor would recommend and secure from the sentencing court 
probation rather than incarceration (R. 205, 220). At the time 
of sentencing, the prosecutor did not recommend probation, as 
agreed,5 but argued to the court that Mr. Edwards was a danger to 
Mr. Edwards informed Judge Dever, who denied the motion 
to withdraw the guilty pleas, of the law pertaining to illusory 
plea agreements and prosecutorial duties to comply with plea 
agreements (e.g. R. 94-95, 31) . 
5
 The plea affidavit states, in relevant part, 
14. My pleas of guilty are the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. 
The promises, duties and provisions of this plea 
bargain, if any, are full [sic] set forth as follows: 
Upon my plea of guilty to Count 1 & 2 the state will 
not charge me with driving on Revocation, will 
recommend probation and not oppose a motion to reduce 
11 
society, and then acquiesced in the recommendation of the 
presentence report, which he characterized as "very lenient." 
His argument was as follows: 
Thank you, Your Honor. I don't understand the 
argument as to the defendant needs to go to work et 
cetera, when the recommendation is that he be granted 
work release. Whether he has a rotating schedule or 
not, all he needs to do to comply would be to submit a 
letter from his employer with his schedule and the jail 
will accommodate him and he'll be able to go to work 
and support the family as he requires. 
This is the defendant's seventh DUI conviction 
and, as the report indicates, it should have been 
charged as a class A misdemeanor. He pled guilty to a 
class B misdemeanor. He has his eighth DUI pending in 
Grantsville which should be a felony and apparently is 
charged as a class B misdemeanor. The defendant 
obviously is a danger to the community. 
We believe that the recommendation is very 
lenient, that it out to be adhered to. In spite of the 
defendant's obtaining treatment, he has again been 
arrested for DUI and obviously cannot control his 
drinking. We believe that the recommendation of 12 0 
days in jail plus the other standard provisions for an 
alcohol offense is reasonable. 
(R. 134) . 
Utah law is quite clear in indicating that prosecutors must 
fulfill the terms of their plea agreements. " [W]here a defendant 
reasonably relies on a governmental promise to his or her 
detriment, that promise must be fulfilled." State v. Troyer. 910 
P. 2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted) . When a prosecutor 
fails to perform the agreed conditions of the plea agreement, the 
plea is rendered involuntary and the defendant is entitled to 
withdraw his plea. State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1275-76 
Count 1 to a class A misdemeanor upon completion of 
probatiorl. 
(R. 10)(emphasis in original). 
12 
(Utah 1988). See also State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-
Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah App. 1990) ("Plea agreements 
must be entered into knowingly and voluntarily and if 'induced by 
promises, the essence of those promises must in some way be made 
known.' '[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a 
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to 
be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled.'") (citation omitted) .6 
Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor's agreement to 
recommend probation also encompassed the possibility that he 
would recommend some incarceration, this demonstrates a failure 
of Mr. Edwards to understand the plea bargain, which would 
entitle him to withdrawal under cases such as Copeland and West, 
supra. 
Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor's recommendation that 
Mr. Edwards serve one hundred and twenty days in jail constitutes 
a recommendation for probation, the prosecutor's nominal 
acquiescence to the recommendation of the presentence report was 
sharply undercut by his argument that Mr. Edwards is a danger to 
society, quoted above. 
Several courts have recognized that in such situations, when 
a prosecutor effectively argues against his nominal 
recommendation, this constitutes a breach of the plea agreement 
Mr. Edwards informed Judge Dever of the law pertaining 
to illusory plea agreements and prosecutorial duties to comply 
with plea agreements (e.g. R. 94-95, 31). 
13 
to make the recommendation. See e.g. United States v. 
Grandinetti, 564 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1977)(prosecution breached 
plea agreement to recommend a particular sentence when prosecutor 
acknowledged the obligation to recommend the sentence agreed 
upon, but in effect argued against the recommendation); United 
States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974) ("prosecution 
breached plea agreement to recommend a particular sentence when 
prosecutor's argument "effectively undercut" the recommendation). 
Because the prosecutor failed to abide by the terms and 
conditions of the plea agreement, Mr. Edwards is entitled to 
withdraw his pleas. E.g. Copeland, supra. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO 
FOLLOW RULE 11 IN THE ENTRY 
OF THE PLEAS ENTITLES MR. EDWARDS TO 
WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEAS. 
At the time that Mr. Edwards entered his guilty pleas in 
this case, the trial court was required to strictly comply with 
the terms of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting the 
guilty pleas. E.g. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987).7 
Rule 11 is designed to protect the defendant's right to due 
process of law, and the constitutional rights that are implicated 
in the entry of the guilty plea. See State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 
666
 f 670-771 (Utah App. 1993). 
Under Gibbons, a trial court accepting a guilty plea has the 
Mr. Edwards informed Judge Dever of the need for strict 




"personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea 
is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the 
record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her 
constitutional rights and understood the elements of 
the crime." Finally, in addition to confirming that 
the defendant understands the elements of the crime, 
the trial court must determine that the defendant 
"'possesses an understanding of the law in relation to 
the facts'" for the defendant's plea to be "'truly 
voluntary.'" 
State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372-373 (Utah 1996)(emphasis in 
original, citations omitted). 
On August 7, 1996, when Mr. Edwards pled guilty, Utah Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 11 provided, in relevant part, 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a 
defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the 
defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant 
shall not be required to plead until the defendant has 
had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may 
not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented 
by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived 
the right to counsel and does not desire 
counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to 
the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance 
of defense witnesses, and that by entering 
the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which the plea 
is entered, that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
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(5) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum 
sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of 
a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, 
and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of 
the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that 
the right of appeal is limited. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed 
by the court, the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is 
not binding on the court. 
In assessing compliance with rule 11 and the constitutional 
requirements, this Court may consider the plea colloquy, the plea 
affidavit, and other documents in the record. Thurman, 911 P.2d 
371 at 374. 
At the outset of the hearing on the motion to withdraw the 
pleas, counsel for Mr. Edwards informed the trial court that Mr. 
Edwards was not advised of his rights, and that the pleas were 
involuntarily entered (R. 191). 
A review of the plea colloquy, affidavit and full record 
confirms numerous errors in the entry of Mr. Edwards' pleas, to 
be addressed in the order in which they arise in Rule 11. 
A. THERE WAS NO WAIVER OF COUNSEL. 
As noted above, under subsection (a) of rule 11, Mr. Edwards 
should not have been permitted to represent himself in this case 
until the court established a waiver of counsel on the record. 
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See also e.g. State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 
1987)(discussing record of waiver that trial court should 
establish in allowing defendant to represent himself). 
Prior to the entry of the guilty plea by one representing 
himself, under subsection (e)(1) of rule 11, the district court 
accepting the plea must establish both a knowing waiver of 
counsel, and that the defendant does not desire counsel. 
The record contains no waiver of counsel.8 
During the plea colloquy, the trial court mentioned that Mr. 
Edwards was representing himself (R. 122), but never discussed 
Mr. Edwards' right to counsel on the record, or established that 
Mr. Edwards waived his right to counsel prior to accepting 
Edwards' guilty pleas (R. 122-127). 
The plea affidavit does not indicate that Mr. Edwards waived 
his right to counsel, but states in paragraph 2, "I have not 
waived my right to counsel. My attorney is None, and I have had 
an opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights and the 
consequences of my pleas with my attorneys. I am satisfied with 
his/her advice." (R. 12) . The affidavit is replete with 
references to "my attorney" and indicates that Edwards is 
8
 At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the pleas, the 
prosecutor argued that the plea affidavit indicated that Mr. 
Edwards made a knowing waiver of counsel (R. 228). At the 
hearing on the motion for a certificate of probable cause, the 
prosecutor argued, "The defendant knowingly and intelligently 
waived his right to counsel at the time the plea was entered. 
The Court carefully questioned him about that." (R. 148). 
The plea affidavit and transcript of the plea colloquy do 
not bear these assertions out. 
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satisfied with the advice and assistance of his attorneys (R. 9). 
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, 
Mr. Edwards testified that he could not afford to hire counsel 
within the time frame established by Judge Pitt, who was 
initially presiding over the case, but that Judge Pitt refused to 
appoint counsel to represent him, ruling that he was not indigent 
(R. 197-203).9 Mr. Edwards testified that he would have accepted 
appointed counsel had counsel been offered by the court (R. 2 04). 
Mr. Edwards testified that on the date that he pled guilty, he 
came and talked with the prosecutor and explained that he could 
not afford counsel and thought he would just have to plead guilty 
(R. 2 04). In contrast, the prosecutor indicated that Judge Pitt 
had offered to provide appointed counsel (R. 2 03). 
Regardless of Mr. Edwards' personal state of mind or 
entitlement to appointed counsel, Judge Rokich's failure to 
strictly comply with rule 11 by obtaining a waiver of counsel 
prior to the entry of the pleas justified withdrawal of the 
guilty pleas. E.g. Gibbons. supra. 
B. THERE WAS NO FINDING THAT THE DUI PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY. 
While the trial court made the finding that the possession 
plea was voluntarily entered with the defendant's understanding 
of the elements of the crime, the court made no such finding on 
the plea to DUI (R. 124, 126). 
Mr. Edwards grossed approximately $2,000 a month, 
netted approximately $370 every two weeks and paid approximately 
$420 every two weeks in child support (R. 198-200). He owned no 
real estate or cars (R. 201) . 
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As is discussed herein, the record as a whole demonstrates 
that neither plea entered by Mr. Edwards was voluntary, and that 
withdrawal was appropriate. 
C. MR. EDWARDS WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED OF THE TRIAL RIGHTS HE 
WAIVED BY ENTERING THE PLEAS. 
Under subsection (e)(3) of rule 11, the trial court is 
required to inform a defendant entering guilty pleas that by 
entering the pleas, he is waiving numerous fundamental trial 
rights. That subsection requires trial courts to ascertain that 
the defendant knows of the right to the 
presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, 
the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights 
are waived[.] 
The plea affidavit signed by Mr. Edwards makes no mention of 
the presumption of innocence, of the right to a speedy public 
trial, of the right to an impartial jury (R. 9-14).10 
The plea affidavit provides, in relevant part, 
I am entering these pleas of guilty voluntarily 
and with knowledge and understanding of the following 
facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented 
by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an 
attorney will be appointed for me by the Court at no 
cost to myself. 
2. I have not waived my right to counsel. My 
attorney is None, and I have had an opportunity to 
discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences 
of my pleas with my attorneys. I am satisfied with 
his/her advice. 
3. I have read this statement and understand the 
nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this 
and other proceedings, and the consequences of my 
guilty pleas. 
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In the plea colloquy, the court did not inform Mr. Edwards 
of the presumption of innocence, his rights to a public trial 
before an impartial jury, or of the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses.11 
4. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
5. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have 
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
against me or to have them cross-examined by my 
attorney. I also know that I have the right to have my 
witnesses subpoenaed by the State at no expense to 
myself unless convicted, and to have them testify in my 
behalf. 
6. I know that I have the right to testify in my 
own behalf, but if I choose not to do so, I cannot be 
compelled to testify or give evidence against myself 
and no adverse inferences will be drawn against me if I 
do not testify. 
7. I know that if I wish to contest the charges 
against me, I need only plead "not guilty" or maintain 
my previously entered no guilty pleas, and the matters 
will be set for trial, at which time the State of Utah 
will have the burden of proving each element of the 
charges beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is 
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading guilty 
I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set 
forth in the preceding paragraphs. I know that by 
entering such pleas I am admitting and do here so admit 
that I have committed the conduct alleged and giving 
rise to the crimes of which I am pleading guilty. 
(R. 11-13) . 
n
- This portion of the plea colloquy includes the full 
advisement given concerning trial rights waived by the entry of 
the pleas: 
You understand by entering a plea of guilty you're 
going to be giving up certain constitutional rights, 
such as the right to a speedy trial, a right to be 
tried by a jury. You have a right to remain silent 
during the proceedings and it will not be held against 
you. You have a right to call witnesses in your own 
behalf. You have a right to confront and cross examine 
witnesses in your own behalf. You have a right to 
confront and cross examine witnesses called by the 
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Review of the record demonstrates that neither the trial 
court nor the plea affidavit informed Mr. Edwards that in 
pleading guilty, he was waiving his fundamental rights to the 
presumption of innocence and to an impartial jury. 
The trial court's failure to comply with rule 11 in the 
entry of the pleas justifies their withdrawal. E.g. Gibbons. 
D. THE WAS NO ESTABLISHMENT OF A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEAS. 
Under subsection (e)(4) of rule 11, the trial court must 
establish that 
the defendant understands the nature and elements 
of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements[.] 
Under this subsection, the trial court has the obligation to find 
that the defendant understands "the elements of the crimes 
charged and the relationship of the law to the facts." State v. 
Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). 
The common law also requires that the trial court establish 
a factual basis for any guilty plea prior to its entry. See e.g. 
State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671-672 (Utah App. 1993). This 
means that the record must demonstrate facts which would support 
a conviction for the offense to which the defendant pleads 
State. The fact that you remain silent during the 
proceedings will not be held against you. 
The State must prove each and every element of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. If the State fails to 
do so, the case will be dismissed against you. 
However, if you're convicted you have the right to 
appeal. 
(R. 123) . 
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guilty. See State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 375 (Utah 1996). 
The factual basis requirement is tied directly to the 
voluntariness of the plea; if the defendant does not understand 
and admit to being guilty of the offense to which he pleads 
guilty, the plea is not constitutionally voluntary. See e.g. 
State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988). 
The plea affidavit provides the following discussion of the 
elements of the offenses to which Mr. Edwards pled guilty: 
The elements of the crimes to which I am pleading 
guilty are as follows: 
1) knowingly and intentionally exercised control 
over a controlled substance on May 26, 1996 in Tooele 
County, Utah 
2) I drove a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol to a degree I could not drive 
safely on May 25, 1996 in Tooele County, UT 
(R. 13) . 
The portion of the plea affidavit discussing the conduct 
constituting the offenses to which Mr. Edwards pled guilty 
provides, 
My conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable, that constitutes the 
elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
are as follows: 
I was driving and saw a policeman following me so 
I stopped and he made a U turn and came back to my 
location, had me do field sobriety tests and arrested 
me for DUI. He found methamphetamine in the car. 
(R. 13) . 
This discussion of conduct fails to provide a factual basis 
for the possession charge, because the officer's having found 
drugs in the car does not in itself establish possession within 
the meaning of section 58-37-8. See e.g. State v. Hansen, 732 
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P. 2d 127, 131-32 (Utah 1987) ("The mere occupancy of a portion of 
the premises where the drug is found cannot, without more, 
support a finding of its knowing and intentional possession by 
the accused.") . 
The discussion likewise fails to provide a factual basis for 
the DUI plea, for it does nothing to establish that Mr. Edwards 
was driving while under the influence to a degree that he could 
not do so safely or with the requisite blood or breath alcohol 
level. See Utah Code Ann. section 41-6-44 (defining offense of 
driving under the influence). 
The trial court's colloquy with Mr. Edwards on the nature 
and elements of the offense was as follows: 
[THE COURT]: The elements of the crime are found 
in Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8.2.a.i. Utah Code 
Annotated that, "The defendant intentionally and 
knowingly possessed a controlled substance of 
methamphetamine." Are those the elements of the crime? 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: They are, Your Honor. 
[THE COURT]: And the facts are, Mr. Edwards, that 
on or about May 26, 1996, in Tooele County, State of 
Utah, you did have in your possession, and 
intentionally and knowingly had in your possession 
methamphetamine. Are those the facts? 
[MR. EDWARDS]: Yes, sir. 
[THE COURT]: Are you entering a plea of guilty 
because you are, in fact, guilty of the crime as 
charged in Count I? 
[MR. EDWARDS]: Yes. 
[THE COURT]: What is your plea then to possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony? 
Guilty or not guilty? 
[MR. EDWARDS]: Guilty. 
[THE COURT] Will you sign the statement there that 
is before you? The Court will find that the defendant 
fully understands the elements of the crime and 
knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty. 
[THE COURT]: Mr. Edwards --- first of all, the 
Court has foudn that he knowingly and voluntarily 
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entered his plea of guilty to Count I. On Count II I 
can go through the whole routine again, but will you 
accept what I've asked you about on Count II the 
elements are found in Title 41, Chapter 6, Section 44, 
that you were "Driving or in actual, physical control 
of a vehicle of having blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater or were under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to the degree which 
rendered defendant incapable of driving said vehicle. 
Are those the elements? Are those the elements? 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes, incapable of safely 
driving. 
[THE COURT]: And the facts are that on May 26, 
1996, in Tooele County, State of Utah, you were driving 
a vehicle under the influence. Are those the facts? 
[MR. EDWARDS]: Yes, sir. 
[THE COURT]: What is your plea then to driving or 
in actual physical control of a vehicle while having a 
blood or breath alcohol content of .08 grams or greater 
or while under the influence of alcohol? What is your 
plea? Guilty or not guilty? 
[MR. EDWARDS]: Guilty, Your Honor. 
(R. 124-126). 
The trial court's colloquy failed to establish the 
possession offense, for the court merely used the term possession 
without explanation, and did nothing to clarify the plea 
affidavit, to determine whether there were sufficient facts to 
establish the legal element of constructive possession. 
The trial court's discussion failed to establish facts 
sufficient to justify a DUI conviction, for the court failed to 
establish that Mr. Edwards had the requisite blood or breath 
alcohol level, or was under the influence to such an extent as to 
render him incapable of safely driving. 
The transcript of the sentencing hearing confirms that Mr. 
Edwards has consistently maintained that the drugs found in the 
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car were not his (R. 138-140). 
The factual basis established on this record falls short of 
establishing either offense. £f. e.g. State v. Breckenridge, 688 
P.2d 440 (Utah 1983)(defendant admitted to having committed each 
element of offense during plea colloquy, but because his factual 
account was inconsistent with his having committed the offense, 
the court found that he did not understand the nature and 
elements of offense). See also State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987)(discussing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238 (1969), and the importance of establishing record of facts to 
support pleas). 
E. MR. EDWARDS WAS NOT INFORMED ACCURATELY OF THE POTENTIAL 
SENTENCES. 
Under subsection (e)(3) of rule 11, a trial court accepting 
a guilty plea must first establish that 
the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, 
and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the 
minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences[.] 
Accord Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Utah 1989). 
While the plea affidavit accurately sets forth potential 
sentences for a third degree felony and a class B misdemeanor, 
and properly categorizes the offenses to which Mr. Edwards pled 
as a third degree felony and a class B misdemeanor (R. 13-14), 
when Judge Rokich took the pleas, he erroneously informed Mr. 
Edwards that in pleading guilty to the DUI charge, he was 
pleading to a class A misdemeanor, punishable by one year in jail 
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and a $2,500 fine (R. 125). 
Judge Rokich's explanation of concurrent and consecutive 
sentences was also erroneous. He stated, 
[THE COURT]: . . . Since there's two counts, the 
Court can sentence you consecutively or concurrently. 
Now if you're sentenced concurrently you would spend 0-
5 years in the Utah State Prison and fined $5,000. 
Upon the conclusion of that sentence then you could 
spend a year in the Tooele County Jail and pay a fine 
of $2,500. 
If they run concurrently, if they sentence you to 
prison for a third degree then you're going to serve 
the one time, and the sentencing would merge with 
whatever the Judge sentenced you. Do you understand? 
[MR. EDWARDS]: Yes. 
(R. 125-126). 
Neither the plea affidavit nor the trial court informed Mr. 
Edwards that an administrative consequence of both convictions 
was the loss of his license, under Utah Code Ann. section 41-6-
44(11)(1996), and under Utah Code Ann. section 53-3-220 
(1) (c) (i) (A) (1994) . 
The trial court's failure to clearly inform Mr. Edwards of 
the potential sentences and consequences of the convictions is an 
adequate basis for withdrawal of the pleas. See e.g. State in re 
Hill, 621 P.2d 705 (Utah 1980)(conviction could not stand, where 
juvenile and his father were not informed of the potential 
consequences of his guilty plea); State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 
1332, 1335 (Utah 1989) (per curiam) (conviction reversed in part 
for trial court's failure to advise defendant of the consequences 
of his plea). 
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F. MR. EDWARDS WAS NOT PROPERLY INFORMED THAT HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL 
WAS LIMITED BY THE ENTRY OF HIS PLEA. 
Subsection (e)(8) of rule 11 requires that the defendant be 
informed that the right of appeal is limited by the entry of the 
plea. 
The plea affidavit informs Mr. Edwards that if he went to 
trial, he would have the right to appeal (R. 11-12), but then 
erroneously indicates in a general paragraph that all of the 
preceding rights are waived by the entry of the guilty pleas (R. 
11) . 
Judge Rokich informed Mr. Edwards that he would have a right 
to appeal from a conviction (R. 123), but did not inform him that 
his right to appeal would be limited by the entry of the pleas. 
This failure to follow rule 11 in the entry of the pleas 
justifies their withdrawal. E.g. Gibbons, supra. 
III. 
ALL ERRORS DURING AND FOLLOWING THE ENTRY OF THE PLEAS 
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ON THE MERITS. 
As previously noted, counsel for Mr. Edwards filed a motion 
to withdraw the guilty pleas with supporting memoranda, and 
conducted an evidentiary hearing in support of the motion (R. 15-
20, 29-36, 45-52, 191-232, 92-99). During the course of these 
matters, counsel informed Judge Dever that Mr. Edwards had not 
been advised of his rights (R. 191), that the pleas were 
involuntarily entered (R. 191), of the law requiring strict 
compliance with rule 11 in the entry of guilty pleas (R. 19, 31-
35, 94), and of the law governing illusory or breached promises 
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in plea bargaining (R. 31, 94-95) . 
Judge Dever had the plea affidavit in the file, and was 
given a copy of the transcript of the plea colloquy (R. 7-14, 
52). In denying the motion to withdraw the pleas from the bench, 
Judge Dever stated, 
I think the critical thing to look at here is the 
plea affidavit that the defendant entered into. That 
outlines what the elements of the crime are and what 
rights he will be giving up by entering this plea. I 
have also reviewed the transcript of the actual plea 
itself and it appears from reading through this that 
Mr. Edwards['] plea was voluntarily and knowing the 
full understanding of his rights and I do not believe 
that there are sufficient ground to allow him to 
withdraw his guilty plea, therefore, I will deny your 
motion. 
(R. 230). 
From this record, this Court may fairly conclude that the 
matters raised herein were brought to the attention of the trial 
court and ruled upon.12 
To the extent that defense counsel omitted raising a 
specific objection in the trial court to any of the errors 
discussed above, this Court should nonetheless address the merits 
of each error under the plain error or ineffective assistance of 
counsel doctrines. 
Under the plain error doctrine, appellate courts should 
address those errors that are both plain and prejudicial, and may 
At the time of Judge Dever's denial of the motion to 
withdraw the pleas, the prosecutor had not breached the plea 
agreement to recommend probation at sentencing. However, the 
breach was raised at the hearing on the motion for a certificate 
of probable cause, and Judge Dever denied that motion (R. 151, 
102-103). 
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address heavily prejudicial errors that may not have been plain 
to the trial court. E.g. State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 35 and 
n.8 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
The errors involved in the instant matter should have been 
plain to Judge Dever. The law forbidding illusory or broken 
promises by prosecutors in the plea bargaining process, discussed 
above in Point I of this brief, is well established and clear-
cut. Similarly, the law requiring strict compliance with rule 
11, discussed above in Point II of this brief is very well 
established and bright lined. 
Given the availability of governing law and the trial 
court's review of the plea affidavit and the transcript of the 
plea colloquy, and presence at sentencing, the errors discussed 
in Points I and II of this brief are readily apparent and plain. 
See State v. Breckenridge, 688 P0.2d 440 (Utah 1983)(court 
permitted claim to be raised for the first time on appeal that 
defendant's right to due process of law was substantially 
effected by his entry of a plea in the absence of his 
understanding of the nature and elements of the crime, and in the 
absence of a factual basis for the plea); State v. Brown, 853 
P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 1992)(characterizing Breckenridge as "a 
case of plain error in which the Eldredae standard was clearly 
met.") . See also e.g. State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah 
App.)(Court may consider failure to comply with rule 11 and 
Gibbons for first time on appeal under the manifest or plain 
error doctrine), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); State 
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v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, (Utah App. 1989) {per curiam) (same) . 
Assuming arguendo that the errors were not plain, given 
their highly prejudicial nature, this Court should correct them. 
Mr. Edwards has suffered and will continue to suffer the 
consequences of a felony and a misdemeanor conviction because he 
pled guilty as charged without counsel and without understanding 
the ramifications and consequences of his pleas. Particularly 
where the prosecutor's illusory promise and breached promise 
rendered the pleas involuntary, and where the record fails to 
establish a factual basis for the pleas, resort to the plain 
error doctrine is appropriate. See e.g. Breckenridge and Brown, 
supra. 
Alternatively, this Court should reach the merits of all 
issues on the basis of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrine.13 In order to establish ineffective assistance of 
It should be noted that trial counsel for Mr. Edwards 
continues to represent him on appeal. 
In State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900 (Utah App.), vacated on 
other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996), this Court indicated 
that claims of plain error should normally be accompanied by 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because the errors 
should have been plain to trial counsel if the errors should have 
been plain to the trial court. Id. at 906. The Court further 
indicated that "[W]hen trial counsel represents defendant on 
appeal an ineffective assistance claim cannot be raised because 
it is "'unreasonable to expect [trial counsel] to raise the issue 
of his own ineffectiveness at trial no direct appeal.'" Id. at 
907 (citations omitted). 
While the Court may not reasonably expect counsel to allege 
his own ineffectiveness, it is ethical for counsel to do so. 
Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 221 (Utah) ("First, our experience 
has been that counsel in this state have complied with their 
ethical obligations and argued their own ineffectiveness on 
appeal."), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 706 (1994). 
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counsel, a party must establish that counsel's performance was 
objectively deficient and that there is a reasonable probability 
of a different outcome in the absence of this performance. E.g. 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 1989). 
Just as the errors discussed above should have been plain to 
the trial court, the errors should have been plain to defense 
counsel, who had the obligation to see to it that Mr. Edwards' 
rights were protected and that he received the benefits of his 
plea bargain. S£e e.g. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. "The 
Defense Function," Standard 4-3 (requiring defense counsel to 
take all appropriate actions to protect the rights of the 
client). There can be no tactical reason to abstain from raising 
any of the errors discussed above. 
In the absence of trial counsel's failure to raise the 
issues, there is a reasonable probability of a different result, 
given that Mr. Edwards' convictions should not have entered at 
all, as a result of the involuntary nature of the guilty pleas. 
See Verde. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Edwards' convictions and the 
trial court's order denying Mr. Edwards' motion to withdraw the 
guilty pleas. ^ ^ / ' 
Dated this {^ ^ day of August, 1997. 
J ./Franklin Allred 
Counsel for Mr. Edwards 
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I, J. Franklin Allred, hereby certify that I have caused to 
be mailed, first-class postage pre-paid two copies of the 
foregoing to Jan Graham, 23 6 Stata Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, this /X/^* day of August, 1997. 
'j. /ranklin Allred 
Counsel forJMr. Edwards 
^/MAILED this day of August, 1997. 
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and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following crjnm 
Name of Crime Catagory of Offense 
thkNL S_ -Ricw 
B ff\^cfcmgangr 
A second degree felony carries a maximum penalty of one to fifteen years imprisonment in 
the Utah State Prison, a fine of up to $10.000 and a surcharge of 85% of the amount of the fine 
imposed./ A third degree felony carries a maximum penalty of up to five years imprisonment in the 
Utah State Prison, a fine of up to $5,000 and a surcharge of 85% of the amount of the fine 
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li amount of the fine imposed. / A class B misdemeanor carries a maximum penalty of up to six 
/ months incarceration in the Tooele County Detention Center, a fine of up to $1,000.00 and a 
a maximum surcharge of 85% of the amount of the fine imposed./ A class C misdemeanor carries 
t "penalty of up ToWdays incarceration in the Tooele County Detention Center, a fine of up to 
$750.00 and a surcharge of 85% of the amount of the fine imposed. 
I have received a copy of the Information against me, I have read it, and I understand the 
nature and elements of the offenses for which I am pleading guilty. 
The dements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty are as follows: 
Q(\ fYWj**(M<° infftQ^U Gifrfy.f/kh 
2\ 1 drfruaL a, rnoforvehicle IAIKIW cWnc ffiviL rnllluincfl. ci aicoho/ h a 
My conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that 
constitutes the elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty are as follows: 
J l^a^ cWn^Q ck(\d A i ^ a |)fl(ir£ rv\^ r\ pffowmQf^ 
a n d (^HfYXoudos, CL U -fr/<v\ancH carwo, b«cLfe AW ftQram\xK\s hid n\c <fo i^fcl 
^o\) mki ^ s ar\d aM*xk<± /wa f>c h i / (> /-fe ffwA /v^f^<tA^/anru^j^ 
I am entering these pleas of guilty voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of 




1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed for me by the Court at no cost to myself. 
2. I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is AIOKJL , 
and I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my 
pleas with my attorneys. I am satisfied with his/her advice. 
3. I have read this statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, 
my rights in this and other proceedings, and the consequences of my guilty pleas. 
4. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
5. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront and cross examine 
witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the 
right to have my witnesses subpoenaed by the State at no expense to myself unless convicted, and 
to have them testify in my behalf. 
6. I know that I have the right to testify in my own behalf, but if I choose not to do 
so, I cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will 
be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
7. I know that if I wish to contest the charges against me, I need only plead "not 
guilty" or maintain my previously entered not guilty pleas, and these matters will be set for trial, at 
which time the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each element of the charges beyond 
a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 




judge or jury, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, or, where allowed, to the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could not afford to pay the 
costs and attorneys fees for such appeal, those expenses for my first appeal would be paid by the 
State of Utah. 
9. I know that the above set forth maximum possible sentences may be imposed upon 
my pleas of guilty and that the sentence may be for a prison term, a fine or both. I know that in 
addition to the fine, an 85% surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated § 63-63a-l will be 
imposed on all fine amounts. I also know that I may be ordered by the court to make restitution 
to any victim or victims of my offenses. 
10. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for 
additional amounts if my pleas of guilty are for more than one charge. I also know that if I am 
incarcerated, on probation, or awaiting sentencing on any other offenses of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my pleas in the present actions may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
11. I know that if I am presently on probation or parole for other offenses of which I 
was previously convicted, my pleas of guilty in this matter may result in a violation of my 
probation or parole and additional punishment being imposed in the earlier case(s). 
12. I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my statutory and 
constitutional rights set forth in the preceding paragraphs. I know that by entering such pleas I 
am admitting and do here so admit that I have committed the conduct alleged and giving rise to 




13. I understand that any motion to withdraw my pleas of guilty must be filed with the 
court within 30 days after the entry of my guilty pleas. I also understand that my pleas can not be 
withdrawn automatically if the motion to do so is filed within said 30 days, but that I have the 
burden of showing good cause why I should be allowed to withdraw said guilty pleas. 
14. My pleas of guilty are the result of a plea bargain between myself and the 
prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are full set 
forth as follows: . 
'* )/K\ rtW ^Ufi^cl tun \{u ^CfiCNit I I Z f f a s f e f i \rtil*m80PEJ fKfl. 
-dw»u*t CYN fovrecafox^ in\[[ KfomA n^cl p^a ix)n and 
There are no other promises. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of probation 
or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by 
either my defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know 
that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also not binding 
on the court. 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce 
me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained in this agreement have been made to 
me. 




understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorneys. 
19. I am 3 5 years of age; I have attended school through the 1 "2 grade, 
and I can read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants which impaired my ability to intelligently and knowingly make the 
decision to enter these pleas when I made said decision and I am not now under the influence of 
any such drugs, medication or intoxicants. 
20. I believe, myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my pleas and I am free of any mental 
disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
entering my pleas. 







CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
I certify that I am the attorney for , the 
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her 
and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after 
an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations 
and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing statement, are accurate and true. 




CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the cases against 
_ , set forth above. I have reviewed this 
statement of the defendant and find that the declarations, including the elements of the offenses of 
the charges and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offenses are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea 
have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement or as 
supplemented on the record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are 
entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
7Uan K/Jeppesffli W 





Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and certification, the court finds 
the defendant's pleas of guilty are freely and voluntarily made and it is 
ORDERED that the defendant's pleas of guilty to the charges set forth in the statement be 
accepted and entered in the record in these proceedings, and that the defendant stand convicted 
thereof 
n Ail/ 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this 7 day of&w, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
f/T^— / / 
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STATE OF UTAH 
vs . 
Plaintiff 
WILLIAM MICHAEL EDWARDS 
Defendant 
Case No. 961000214 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 11th day of September, 
1996, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before 
the Honorable William E. Pitt, sitting as Judge in the above-
named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For t h e S t a t e 
For William M. Edwards: 
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Utah Conrt of Aoneals 
Marilyn i*. uanch 
Clerk of the Court 
ALAN K. JEPPESEN 
Deputy County Attorney 
47 So. Main Street 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus William Michael 
3 Edwards, case number 961000214. May the record indicate the 
4 defense is present. Are you representing yourself, sir? 
5 MR. EDWARDS: What's that? 
6 THE COURT: Are you representing yourself? 
7 MR. EDWARDS: Yes, I am. 
8 THE COURT: And the State's represented by Mr. 
9 Jeppesen. This is the time set for the Preliminary Hearing. 
10 Mr. Jeppesen, you may call you first witness then. 
11 MR. JEPPESEN: Your Honor, we have come to an 
12 agreement in this matter. The defendant, we understand, is 
13 prepared to waive the Preliminary Hearing and plead guilty to 
14 Count I and Count II. The State has agreed that upon 
15 successful completion of probation that we would now pose a 
16 motion to reduce Count I to a Class A misdemeanor. We also 
17 will recommend probation in this part of the sentence. 
18 There has been a statement prepared. 
19 THE COURT: You want to stand Mr. Edwards? Stand 
2 0 J and be sworn. 
21 WILLIAM MICHAEL EDWARDS, 
22 having first been duly and legally sworn, was 
23 examined and testified on his oath as follows: 
24 THE COURT: Okay, we'll proceed then. QQ j[ ^  ^ 
2 5 Mr. Edwards, do you read, write and understand tta<£ 
Associated Professional Reporters - (801) 322-3441 


































: Yes, I do. 
Are you under the 





your judgment : 
: No, I'm not. 
influence 
Do you have any mental probl 









MR. EDWARDS: No, I don't. 
THE COURT: You don't have an attorney, so 
therefore I'll have to rely upon your statements. You don't 
have to enter a plea of guilty, we'll go to trial if you want 
to go to trial. You don't want to go to trial? 
MR. EDWARDS: No, I don't. 
THE COURT: Now your plea must be unconditional. 
The fact that the State may make a recommendation doesn't 
necessarily mean that the Judge who imposes the sentence will 
follow those recommendations. It's got to be an 
unconditional plea. Do you understand that? Any question 
about it? 
MR. EDWARDS: No. 
THE COURT: If you're not placed on probation 
you're not going to come back in and say, "Well, they 
promised me I'd get probation?" A A 1 4-: ^  
MR. EDWARDS: (Inaudible). 
Associated Professional Reporters - (801) 322-3441
 ( 
Now, 
THE COURT: So as long as we've got that clear. 
you've had an opportunity to go over that statement? 
MR. EDWARDS: Yes, I have. 






6 MR. EDWARDS: No, I don't. 
7 THE COURT: Are the answers given in that statement 
8 truthful and correct? 
9 MR. EDWARDS: Yes, they are. 
10 THE COURT: You understand by entering a plea of 
11 guilty you're going to be giving up certain constitutional 
12 rights, such as the right to a speedy trial, a right to be 
13 tried by a jury. You have a right to remain silent during 
14 the proceedings and it will not be held against you. You 
15 have a right to call witnesses in your own behalf. You have a 
16 right to confront and cross examine witnesses called by the 
17 State. The fact that you remain silent during the 
18 proceedings will not be held against you. 
19 The State must prove each and every element of the crime 
20 beyond a reasonable doubt. If the State fails to do so, the 
21 case will be dismissed against you. However, if you're 
22 convicted you have the right to appeal. 
23 Now, the penalty for a third degree felony is 0-5 years 
24 in the Utah State Prison and a $5,000 fine. The elements of 
25 the crime are found in Title 58, Chapter 37, Secti^iQ 8 .j^a^i. 
A^o^n
 at-,*H Professional Reoorters - (801) 322-3 4*1 
1 Utah Code Annotated that, "The defendant intentionally and 
2 knowingly possessed a controlled substance of 
3 methamphetamine." Are those the elements of the crime? 
4 MR. JEPPESEN: They are, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: And that facts are, Mr. Edwards, that 
6 on or about May 26, 1996, in Tooele County, State of Utah, 
7 you did have in your possession, and intentionally and 
8 knowingly had in your possession methamphetamine. Are those 
9 the facts? 
10 MR. EDWARDS: Yes, sir. 
11 THE COURT: Are you entering a plea of guilty 
12 because you are, in fact, guilty of the crime as charged in 
13 Count I? 
14 MR. EDWARDS: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: What is your plea then to possession of 
16 a controlled substance, a third degree felony? Guilty or not 
17 guilty? 
18 MR. EDWARDS: Guilty. 
19 THE COURT: Will you sign the statement there that 
20 is before you? The Court will find that the defendant fully 
21 understands the elements of the crime and knowingly and 
22 voluntarily entered his plea of guilty. 
23 MR. JEPPESEN: Your, Honor, he's also pleading to 
24 the DUI count too, Class B misdemeanor. Q 0 1 ^ 1 
2 5 THE COURT: Let's go through that therQQ Mf 
Associated Professional Reporters - (801) 322-3441 
1 Edwards first of all, the Court has found that he 
2 knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty to Count 
3 1. On Count II I can go through the whole routine again, but 
4 will you accept what I've asked you about on Count II the 
5 elements are found in Title 41, Chapter 6, Section 44, that 
6 you were "Driving or in actual, physical control of a vehicle 
7 of having blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams 
8 or greater or were under the influence of alcohol or any drug 
9 or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to the 
10 degree which rendered defendant incapable of driving said 
11 vehicle." Are those the elements? 
12 MR. JEPPESEN: Yes, incapable of safely driving. 
13 THE COURT: And the facts are that on May 26, 1996, 
14 in Tooele County, State of Utah, you were driving a vehicle 
15 under the influence. Are those the facts? 
16 MR. EDWARDS: Yes, sir. 
17 I THE COURT: Now you understand the Class A 
18 misdemeanor carries a penalty of one year in the Tooele 
19 County Jail and $2,500 fine. Since there's two counts, the 
20 Court can sentence you consecutively or concurrently. Now if 
21 you're sentenced concurrently you would spend 0-5 years in 
22 the Utah State Prison and fined $5,000. Upon the conclusion 
23 of that sentence then you could spend a year in the Tooele 
24 County Jail and pay a fine of $2,500. Q 0 J. ;„ ij 
25 If they run concurrently, if they sentence yxM)tQifljr^son 
Associated Professional Reporters - (801) 322-3441 
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1 for a third degree then you're going to serve the one time, 
2 and the sentencing would merge with whatever the Judge 
3 I sentenced you. Do you understand? 
MR. EDWARDS: Yes. 
5 I THE COURT: Are you entering a plea of guilty to 
6 Count II, driving under the influence because you were, in 
7 fact, driving under the influence? You're guilty of the 
8 J charge? 
MR. EDWARDS: Yes. 
10 I THE COURT: What is your plea then to driving or in 
11 actual physical control of a vehicle while having a blood or 
12 breath alcohol content of .08 grams or greater or while under 
13 the influence of alcohol? What is your plea? Guilty or not 
14 guilty? 
15 MR. EDWARDS: Guilty, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. You've already signed the 
17 statement. You'll reaffirm signing the statement that you 
18 just signed; right? 
19 MR. EDWARDS: ' Yes. 
2 0 THE COURT: Now the Court must sentence you to not 
21 less than - what, 45 days now that we've got to or 30 days? 
22 MR. JEPPESEN: It's down to 45. 
23 THE COURT: Do you want to waive time for 
24 sentencing so that you can work on a presentence report© J ± "*J L| 
2 5 MR. EDWARDS: You bet. I'd like that. 
Associated Professional Reporters - (801) 322-3441 (50' 
1 THE COURT: And then you can withdraw your guilty 
2 plea to either one of the two counts or to both within 30 
3 days from the date hereof. It will not be automatically 
4 granted unless you can show good cause. Okay? Any questions 
5 I before you leave? 
MR. EDWARDS: I don't. 
7 I THE CLERK: Sentencing is September 23, at 9:30. 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF TOOELE 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the Hearing on the case of STATE 
OF UTAH, vs. WILLIAM MICHAEL EDWARDS, was electronically 
recorded by the Third Circuit Court, Tooele County, State of 
Utah. 
That the said witnesses were, before examination, duly 
sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth in said cause. 
That the said testimony of said witnesses was 
electronically recorded, and thereafter caused by me to be 
transcribed into type writing, and that a true, and correct 
transcription of said testimony so taken and transcribed is 
set forth in the foregoing pages numbered from 1 to 9, 
inclusive and said witnesses testified and said as in the 
foregoing annexed testimony. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 26th day of September, 1996. 
mmmWm!mmmmmt^mXmm^ L a n e t t e S h i n d u r l i n g , RPR 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
(Li^/f /ff? 00 l i b 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED, A0058 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
) TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Judge LEE DEVER 
WILLIAM MIKE EDWARDS, ) 
) Docket No: % /£><££)£/'V 
Defendant. ) 
The Defendant's Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Pleas came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable, Lee Dever, judge of the above entitled Court in his Court Room on 
Monday, December 2, 1996, at the hour of 1:30 p.m. Counsel for the Defendant, J. Franklin 
Allred, was present and the Defendant was present in person and, the State of Utah was 
represented by Deputy County Attorney, Alan Jeppesen. The Defendant was sworn and 
testified and certain exhibits were marked and identified and received and the Court having 
heard the testimony of the Defendant, having reviewed the exhibits received as evidence, 
1 
H P" 
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FILED SY. 
00 0 ^ 
having read the transcript of the proceedings at the time the plea were entered and having 
read and reviewed the STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT, signed by the Defendant at the time 
the pleas were entered and the Court having heard and considered the argument of both 
counsel in connection with their respective positions and being fully advised now therefore 
makes the following order: 
1. The Court finds that the pleas of guilty to the charges, and each of them, were 
freely, knowingly and voluntarily entered by the Defendant. 
2. The Motion of the Defendant To Withdraw His Guilty Pleas Is Denied. 
DATED this ' day of January, 1997. 
At approved as to form and content 
this 3 day of January, 1997. 
00 Obi 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the / 
H 
day of ) j fe l fc^ I pc ersonally hand delivered a copy 
of the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEAS to Alan K. Jeppesen. 
ft 
Dated this £ day of January, 1997 
00 OoO 
Constitution of Utah Article I section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
559 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amend. XVIII, § 1 
AMENDMENT XHI 
Section 
1. (Slavery prohibited.! 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 




1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1 [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
gress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
rized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify.} 
2. [Power to enforce amendment. 1 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color 
not to disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 




The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration. 
AMENDMENT XVII 
[Election of senators.] 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six 
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in 
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors 
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State 
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue 
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the 
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacan-
cies by election as the legislature may direct 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the 
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid 
as part of the Constitution. 
AMENDMENT XVIII 
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT 
XXI, SECTION 1.1 
Section 
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.] 
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Time limit for adoption.] 
Section 1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating li-
quors.] 
After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors 
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof 
(I-(>-4() MOTOR VEHICLES 760 
<2) If a damaged vehicle sticker describing the damage is 
affixed to the vehicle, a report under this section is not 
required. 1987 
41-6-40. Accident reports — When confidential — In-
surance policy information — Use as ev idence 
— Penalty for false information. 
(1) All written reports required in this article to be for-
warded to the department by operators or owners of vehicles 
involved in accidents or by garages are without prejudice to 
the reporting individual and are for the confidential use of the 
department or other state agencies having use for the records 
for accident prevention purposes. However, the department 
may disclose the identity of a person involved in an accident 
when the identity is not otherwise known or when the person 
denies his presence at the accident. The department shall 
disclose whether any person or vehicle involved in an accident 
reported under this section was covered by a vehicle insurance 
policy, and the name of the insurer. 
(2) Written reports forwarded under this section may not be 
used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an 
accident, except that the department shall furnish upon 
demand of any party to the trial or upon demand of any court 
a certificate showing that a specified accident report has or 
has not been made to the department in compliance with law, 
and if the report has been made, the date, time, and location 
of the accident, the names and addresses of the drivers, the 
owners of the vehicles involved, and the investigating officers. 
The reports may be used as evidence when necessary to 
prosecute charges filed in connection with a violation of 
Subsection (3). 
(3) A person who gives information in oral or written 
reports as required in this chapter knowing or having reason 
to believe that the information is false is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 1987 
41-6-41. Statist ical information regarding acc idents — 
Annual publication. 
The department shail tabulate and may analyze all accident 
reports and shall publish annually, or at more frequent 
intervals, related statistical information as to the number and 
circumstances of traffic accidents. 1987 
41-6-42. Local powers to require report. 
A local authority may by ordinance require that the operator 
of a vehicle involved in any accident, or the owner of the 
vehicle, also file with the designated municipal department a 
written report of the accident or a copy of any report required 
under this article to be filed with the department on accidents 
occurring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the confi-
dential use of the municipal department and are subject to 
Section 41-6-40. 1987 
ARTICLE 5 
IMMV1NU W Hi 1 IK INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS 
DRIVING 
41-6-43. Local DUI and related ordinances and reck-
less driv ing ordinances — Consistent wi th 
code. 
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs 
a person's operating or being in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having alcohol in the blood or while under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in relation to any of 
those matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, or 
evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that governs any 
combination of those matters, shall be consistent with the 
provisions in this code which govern those matters. 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs 
reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton 
disregard for the safety of persons or property shall be 
consistent with the provisions of this code which govern those 
matters. 1987 
41-6-43.5. Definit ions. 
As used in this article, "vehicle" or "motor vehicle," in 
addition to the definitions provided under Section 41-6-1, 
includes off-highway vehicles as defined under Section 41-
22-2. 1996 
41-6-43.10. Repealed. 1985 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, 
or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol con-
centrat ion — Measurement of blood or breath 
alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest 
without warrant — Penalt ies — Suspension 
or revocat ion of l icense . 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a viola-
tion of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsec-
tions (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alco-
hol-related reckless driving adopted in compliance 
with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; 
or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other 
state, the United States, or any district, possession, 
or territory of the United States which would consti-
tute a violation of this section or alcohol-related 
reckless driving if committed in this state, including 
punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. 815; 
(b) a violation of this section includes a violation under 
a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in com-
pliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(c) the standard of negligence is that of simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an 
ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under 
like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test 
given within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this 
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a 
drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this 
section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based 
jpon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and 
alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation 
of Subsection (2) is guilty of a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor; or 
(b) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as 
a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a 
negligent manner; or 
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<ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the 
vehicle at the time of the offense. 
il <a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, 
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence 
of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 
hours. 
(b) The court- may, as an alternative to all or part of a 
jail sentence, require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more 
than 50 hours. 
<c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall: 
t i) order the person to participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate; 
and 
di) impose a fine of not less than $700, but not 
more than $1,000. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, 
the court may order the person to obtain treatment at 
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility 
if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilita-
tion facility determines that the person has a problem 
condition involving alcohol or drugs. 
")) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within 
six years of a prior conviction under this section, the court 
shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more 
than 720 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a 
jail sentence, require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 80 hours nor more 
than 240 hours. 
ic) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall: 
O) order the person to participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate; 
and 
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $800, but not 
more than $1,000. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain treatment 
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
5) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of two or more prior convic-
tions under this section is a: 
(i) class A misdemeanor except as provided in 
Subsection (ii); and 
(ii) third degree felony if at least: 
(A) three prior convictions are for violations 
committed after April 23, 1990; or 
(B) two prior convictions are for violations 
committed after July 1, 1996. 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (aHi) the court shall as part of 
any sentence impose a fine of not less than $2,000, 
but not more than $5,000 and impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 
2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of 
a jail sentence, require the person to work in a 
community-service work program for not less than 
240 nor more than 720 hours, but only if the court 
enters in writing on the record the reason it finds the 
defendant should not serve the jail sentence. Enroll-
ment in and completion of an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation program approved by the court 
may be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or 
community service if the program provides intensive 
care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely 
supervised follow-through after the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, 
(c) Under Subsection (aMii) if the court suspends the 
execution of a prison sentence and places the defendant 
on probation the court shall impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,000 
hours; and 
(iii) an order requiring the person to obtain treat-
ment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
program providing intensive care or inpatient treat-
ment and long-term closely supervised follow-
through after treatment. 
(7) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required 
under this section may not be suspended and the con-
victed person is not eligible for parole or probation until 
any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a 
violation under this section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license sus-
pended or revoked as a result of the conviction under this 
section, until the convicted person has furnished evidence 
satisfactory to the department that: 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assess-
ment, education, treatment, and rehabilitation or-
dered for a violation committed after July 1, 1993, 
have been completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution 
and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person 
have been paid, if the conviction is a second or 
subsequent conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive 
or illegal manner as certified by a licensed alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the convic-
tion is for a third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of two prior 
violations committed after July 1, 1993. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections <4), (5), and <6) 
that require a sentencing court to order a convicted 
person to: participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the 
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment 
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facil-
ity; or do a combination of those things, apply to a 
conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 under 
Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regard-
ing education or treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, in connec-
tion with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under Section 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the 
court would render in connection with applying re-
spectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction 
requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation pro-
gram and any community-based or other education pro-
gram provided for in this section shall be approved by the 
Department of Human Services. 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or 
no contest to a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 
or of an ordinance enacted under Section 41-6-43 in 
satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original 
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charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution 
shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, 
including whether or not there had been consumption 
of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the violation. 
<ii> The statement is an offer of proof of the facts 
that shows whether there was consumption of alco-
hol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, 
in connection with the violation. 
<b> The court shall advise the defendant before accept-
ing the plea offered under this subsection of the conse-
quences of a violation of Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each con-
viction of Section 41-6-45 entered under this subsection. 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person 
jr a violation of this section when the officer has probable 
ause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his 
)iesence. and if the officer has probable cause to believe that 
he violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall: 
(il suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a 
person convicted for the first time under Subsection 
(2); 
<ii) revoke for one year the license of a person 
convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection 
<2) if the violation is committed within a period of six 
years from the date of the prior violation; and 
<iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as 
ordered by the court under Subsection < 12). 
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension 
or revocation period the number of days for which a 
license was previously suspended under Section 5.3-3-223, 
if the previous suspension was based on the same occur-
rence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
<12) <a> In addition to any other penalties provided in this 
section, a court may order the operator's license of a 
person who is convicted of a violation of Subsection «2) to 
be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 
days, 180 days, or one year to remove from the highways 
those persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license 
under this subsection, the court shall prepare and send to 
the Driver License Division of the Department of Public 
Safety an order to suspend or revoke that persons driving 
privileges for a specified period of time. 199« 
41-6-44.1. Procedures — Adjud ica t ive p r o c e e d i n g s . 
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with the 
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its 
adjudicative proceedings. 1987 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. 1983 
41-6-44.3. S t a n d a r d s for c h e m i c a l b r e a t h a n a l y s i s — 
E v i d e n c e . 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety 
shall establish standards for the administration and interpre-
tation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, including 
standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to 
prove tha t a person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or 
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of 
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made 
and the instrument used was accurate, according to standards 
established in Subsection (1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular 
course of the investigation at or about the time of the act, 
condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the 
method and circumstances of their preparation indicate 
their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under 
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been 
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid and 
further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnec-
essary. 1987 
41 -6-44.4. Renumbered as § 53-3-231. iiiiin 
41-6-44.5. Admissibi l i ty of chemical test results in ac-
t ions for driving under the influence — 
Weight of ev idence . 
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which 
it is material to prove that a person was operating or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a 
chemical test or tests as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 
are admissible as evidence. 
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Sec-
tion 41-6-44.10 does not render the results of a chemical 
test inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's blood or 
breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible 
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the 
constitution. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after 
the alleged driving or actual physical control, the test result is 
admissible as evidence of the person's blood or breath alcohol 
level at the time of the alleged operating or actual physical 
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight is 
given to the result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court irom receiving 
otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or 
breath alcohol level or drug level at the time of the alleged 
operating or actual physical control. iftui 
41-6-44.6. Definit ions — Driving with any measurable 
control led substance in the body — Penalties 
— Arrest wi thout warrant. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Controlled substance" means any substance sched-
uled under Section 58-37-4. 
(b) "Practitioner" has the same meaning as provided in 
Section 58-37-2. 
(c) "Prescribe" has the same meaning as provided in 
Section 58-37-2. 
(d) "Prescription" has the same meaning as provided in 
Section 58-37-2. 
(2) In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6-44, 
a person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle within this state if the person has any measur-
able controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled sub-
stance in the person's body. 
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this 
section that the controlled substance was involuntarily in-
gested by the accused or prescribed by a practitioner for use by 
the accused. 
(4) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(5) A peace officer may, without a warrant , arrest a person 
for a violation of this section when the officer has probable 
cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in the 
officer's presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(6) The Driver License Division shall: 
(a) suspend, for 90 days, the driver license of a person 
convicted under Subsection (2); and 
( fill 
Utah Code Ann. section 53-3-220 (1994) 
(1)(a) The division shall immediately revoke or, 
when this chapter or Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules 
and Regulations, specifically provides for denial, 
suspension, or disqualification, the division shall 
deny, suspend, or disqualify the license of a person 
upon receiving a record of his conviction for any of 
the following offenses: 
(i) manslaughter or negligent 
homicide resulting from driving a 
motor vehicle, or automobile 
homicide under Section 76-5-207; 
(ii) driving or being in 
actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of them to a degree 
that renders the person incapable 
of safely driving a motor vehicle 
as prohibited in Section 41-6-44 or 
as prohibited in an ordinance that 
complies with the requirements of 
Subsection 41-6-43(1); 
(iii) driving or being in 
actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or 
breath alcohol content prohibited 
in Section 41-6-44 or as prohibited 
in an ordinance that complies with 
the requirements of Subsection 
41-6-43 (1) ; 
(iv) perjury or the making of 
a false affidavit to the division 
under this chapter, Title 41, Motor 
Vehicles, or any other law of this 
state requiring the registration of 
motor vehicles or regulating 
driving on highways; 
(v) any offense punishable as 
a felony under the motor vehicle 
laws of this state; 
(vi) any other felony in which 
a motor vehicle is used; 
(vii) failure to stop and 
render aid as required under the 
laws of this state if a motor 
vehicle accident results in the 
death or personal injury of 
another; 
(viii) two charges of reckless 
driving committed within a period 
of 12 months; but if upon a first 
conviction of reckless driving the 
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judge or justice recommends 
suspension of the convicted 
person's license, the division may 
after a hearing suspend the license 
for a period of three months; 
(ix) failure to bring a motor 
vehicle to a stop at the command of 
a peace officer as required in 
Section 41-6-13.5; 
(x) any offense specified in 
Part 4 of this chapter that 
requires disqualification; 
(xi) discharging or allowing 
the discharge of a firearm from a 
vehicle in violation of Subsection 
76-10-508(2) ; 
(xii) using, allowing the use 
of, or causing to be used any 
explosive, chemical, or incendiary 
device from a vehicle in violation 
of Subsection 76-10-306 (4) (b) ; and 
(xiii) operating or being in 
actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite 
of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) The division shall immediately 
revoke the license of a person upon receiving 
a record of an adjudication under Title 78, 
Chapter 3a, Juvenile Courts, for any of the 
following offenses: 
(i) discharging or allowing 
the discharge of a firearm from a 
vehicle in violation of Subsection 
76-10-508 (2) ; and 
(ii) using, allowing the use 
of, or causing to be used any 
explosive, chemical, or incendiary 
device from a vehicle in violation 
of Subsection 76-10-306(4)(b). 
(c) The division shall immediately 
suspend for six months the license of a 
person upon receiving a record of conviction 
for any of the following offenses: 
(i) any violation of: 
(A) Title 58, 
Chapter 37, Utah 
Controlled Substances 
Act; 
(B) Title 58, 
Chapter 3 7a, Utah Drug 
Paraphernalia Act; 
(C) Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Imitation 
Controlled Substances 
Act; 
(D) Title 58, 
Chapter 37c, Utah 
Controlled Substance 
Precursor Act; or 
(E) Title 58, 
Chapter 37d, Clandestine 
Drug Lab Act; or 





sale, or transfer of any 
substance that is 
prohibited under the acts 
described in Subsection 
(c) (i) ; or 
(B) the attempt or 
conspiracy to possess, 
distribute, manufacture, 
cultivate, sell, or 
transfer any substance 
that is prohibited under 
the acts described in 
Subsection (c)(i). 
(2) The division shall extend the period of the 
first denial, suspension, revocation, or 
disqualification for an additional like period, upon 
receiving: 
(a) a record of the conviction of any 
person on a charge of driving a motor vehicle 
while the person's license is denied, 
suspended, revoked, or disqualified; 
(b) a record of a conviction of the 
person for any violation of the motor vehicle 
law in which the person was involved as a 
driver; 
(c) a report of an arrest of the person 
for any violation of the motor vehicle law in 
which the person was involved as a driver; 
or 
(d) a report of an accident in which the 
person was involved as a driver. 
(3) When the division receives a report under 
Subsection (2)(c) or (d) that a person is driving while 
the person's license is denied, suspended, 
disqualified, or revoked, the person is entitled to a 
hearing regarding the extension of the time of denial, 
suspension, disqualification, or revocation originally 
imposed under Section 53-3-221. 
(4)(a) The division may extend to a person the 
limited privilege of driving a motor vehicle to and 
from the person's place of employment or within other 
specified limits on recommendation of the trial judge 
in any case where a person is convicted of any of the 
offenses referred to in Subsections (1) and (2) except 
(i) automobile homicide under 
Subsection (1)(a)(i); 
(ii) those offenses referred 
to in Subsections (1) (a) (ii) , 
(a) (iii) , (a) (xi) , (a) (xii) , 
(a) (xiii) , ( 1 M b ) , and (1) (c) ; and 
(iii) those offenses referred 
to in Subsection (2) when the 
original denial, suspension, 
revocation, or disqualification was 
imposed because of a violation of 
Section 41-6-44, Section 41-6-44.6, 
a local ordinance which complies 
with the requirements of Subsection 
41-6-43(1), Section 41-6-44.10, or 
Section 76-5-207, or a criminal 
prohibition that the person was 
charged with violating as a result 
of a plea bargain after having been 
originally charged with violating 
one or more of these sections or 
ordinances. 
(b) This discretionary privilege is 
limited to when undue hardship would result 
from a failure to grant the privilege and may 
be granted only once to any individual during 
any single period of denial, suspension, 
revocation, or disqualification, or extension 
of that denial, suspension, revocation, or 
disqualification. 
(c) A limited CDL may not be granted to 
an individual disqualified under Part 4 of 
this chapter or whose license has been 
revoked, suspended, cancelled, or denied 
under this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8 
(1) Prohibited acts A --Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this 
chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or 
dispense, or to possess with intent 
to produce, manufacture, or 
dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled 
or counterfeit substance, or to 
agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled 
substance in the course of his 
business as a sales representative 
of a manufacturer or distributor of 
substances listed in Schedules II 
through V except that he may 
possess such controlled substances 
when they are prescribed to him by 
a licensed practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or 
counterfeit substance with intent 
to distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating 
Subsection (1)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in 
Schedule I or II is guilty of a 
second degree felony and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction of 
Subsection (1)(a) is guilty of a 
first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in 
Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, 
is guilty of a third degree felony, 
and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this 
subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified 
in Schedule V is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly 
and intentionally to possess or use 
a controlled substance, unless it 
was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly 
from a practitioner while acting in 
the course of his professional 
practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this subsection; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, 
licensee, or person in control of 
any building, room, tenement, 
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other 
place knowingly and intentionally 
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have to enter a plea of guilty, we'll go to trial if you want 
to go to trial. You don't want to go to trial? 
MR. EDWARDS: No, I don"t. 
THE COURT: Now your plea must be unconditional. 
The fact that the State may make a recommendation doesn't 
necessarily mean that the Judge who imposes the sentence will 
follow those recommendations. It's got to be an 
unconditional plea. Do you understand that? Any question 
about it? 
MR. EDWARDS: No. 
THE COURT: If you're not placed on probation 
you're not going to come back in and say, "Well, they 
promised me I'd get probation?" A A j '^ t 
MR. EDWARDS: (Inaudible). 
Associated Professional Reporters - (801) 322-3441 ,
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1 THE COURT: So as long as we've got that clear. 
2 Now, you've had an opportunity to go over that statement? 
3 MR. EDWARDS: Yes, I have. 
4 THE COURT: Do you have any questions about that 
5 statement? 
6 MR. EDWARDS: No, I don't. 
7 THE COURT: Are the answers given in that statement 
8 truthful and correct? 
9 MR. EDWARDS: Yes, they are. 
10 THE COURT: You understand by entering a plea of 
11 guilty you're going to be giving up certain constitutional 
12 rights, such as the right to a speedy trial, a right to be 
13 tried by a jury. You have a right to remain silent during 
14 the proceedings and it will not be held against you. You 
15 have a right to call witnesses in your own behalf. You have a 
16 right to confront and cross examine witnesses called by the 
17 State. The fact that you remain silent during the 
18 proceedings will not be held against you. 
19 The State must prove each and every element of the crime 
20 beyond a reasonable doubt. If the State fails to do so, the 
21 case will be dismissed against you. However, if you're 
22 convicted you have the right to appeal. 
23 Now, the penalty for a third degree felony is 0-5 years 
24 in the Utah State Prison and a $5,000 fine. The elements of 
25 the crime are found in Title 58, Chapter 37, Secti@iQ 8 /£jja^i. 
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persons unlawfully possessing, 
using, or distributing controlled 
substances in any of those 
locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly 
and intentionally to be present 
where controlled substances are 
being used or possessed in 
violation of this chapter and the 
use or possession is open, obvious, 
apparent, and not concealed from 
those present; however, a person 
may not be convicted under this 
subsection if the evidence shows 
that he did not use the substance 
himself or advise, encourage, or 
assist anyone else to do so; any 
incidence of prior unlawful use of 
controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut 
this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly 
and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled 
substance; 
(v) for a practitioner 
licensed under this chapter 
knowingly and intentionally to 
prescribe, administer, or dispense 
a controlled substance to a 
juvenile, without first obtaining 
the consent required in Section 
78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or 
person standing in loco parentis of 
the juvenile except in cases of an 
emergency; for purposes of this 
subsection, a juvenile means a 
"minor" as defined in Section 
78-3a-103, and "emergency" means 
any physical condition requiring 
the administration of a controlled 
substance for immediate relief of 
pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner 
licensed under this chapter 
knowingly and intentionally to 
prescribe or administer dosages of 
a controlled substance in excess of 
medically recognized quantities 
necessary to treat the ailment, 
malady, or condition of the 
ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to 
prescribe, administer, or dispense 
any controlled substance to another 
person knowing that the other 
person is using a false name, 
address, or other personal 
information for the purpose of 
securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating 
Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount 
is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of 
a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in 
Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if 
the amount is more than 16 ounces, 
but less than 100 pounds, is guilty 
of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the 
marijuana is not in the form of an 
extracted resin from any part of 
the plant, and the amount is more 
than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating 
Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the 
exterior boundaries of property occupied by 
any correctional facility as defined in 
Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other 
place of confinement shall be sentenced to a 
penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent 
conviction of possession of any controlled 
substance by a person previously convicted 
under Subsection (2)(b), that person shall be 
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty 
than provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, 
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a 
second conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance as provided in this 
subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent 
conviction he is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating 
Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(vii) 
is: 
(i) on a first conviction, 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor; 
and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent 
conviction, guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this 
chapter to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance in violation 
of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to 
manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense a controlled substance to 
another licensee or other 
authorized person not authorized by 
his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, 
or obliterate a symbol required by 
this chapter or by a rule issued 
under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to 
make, keep, or furnish any record, 
notification, order form, 
statement, invoice, or information 
required under this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any 
premises for inspection as 
authorized by this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating 
Subsection (3)(a) shall be punished by a 
civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The 
proceedings are independent of, and not in 
lieu of, criminal proceedings under this 
chapter or any other law of this state. If 
the violation is prosecuted by information or 
indictment which alleges the violation was 
committed knowingly or intentionally, that 
person is upon conviction guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of 
the manufacture or distribution of 
a controlled substance a license 
number which is fictitious, 
revoked, suspended, or issued to 
another person or, for the purpose 
of obtaining a controlled 
substance, to assume the title of, 
or represent himself to be, a 
manufacturer, wholesaler, 
apothecary, physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, or other authorized 
person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain 
possession of, to procure or 
attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or 
dispense to any person known to be 
attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the 
administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or 
failure by the person to disclose 
his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, 
fraud, forgery, deception, 
subterfuge, alteration of a 
prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or the use of 
a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or 
forged prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance, 
or to utter the same, or to alter 
any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms 
of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or 
fraudulent material information in 
any application, report, or other 
document required to be kept by 
this chapter or to willfully make 
any false statement in any 
prescription, order, report, or 
record required by this chapter; 
or 
(v) to make, distribute, or 
possess any punch, die, plate, 
stone, or other thing designed to 
print, imprint, or reproduce the 
trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or 
device of another or any likeness 
of any of the foregoing upon any 
drug or container or labeling so as 
to render any drug a counterfeit 
controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating 
Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E--Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of 
this section, a person not authorized under 
this chapter who commits any act declared to 
be unlawful under this section, Title 58, 
Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or 
under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction 
subject to the penalties and classifications 
under Subsection (5)(b) if the act is 
committed: 
(i) in a public or private 
elementary or secondary school or 
on the grounds of any of those 
schools; 
(ii) in a public or private 
vocational school or post-secondary 
institution or on the grounds of 
any of those schools or 
institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any 
building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at 
the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through 
a school or institution under 
Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a 
preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, 
amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, 
sports facility, stadium, arena, 
theater, movie house, playhouse, or 
parking lot or structure adjacent 
thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot 
or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any 
structure, facility, or grounds 
included in Subsections (5)(a)(i) 
through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 
18 years of age, regardless of 
where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this 
subsection is guilty of a first degree felony 
and shall be imprisoned for a term of not 
less than five years if the penalty that 
would otherwise have been established but for 
this subsection would have been a first 
degree felony. Imposition or execution of 
the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for parole until the 
minimum term of imprisonment under this 
subsection has been served. 
(c) If the classification that would 
otherwise have been established would have 
been less than a first degree felony but for 
this subsection, a person convicted under 
this subsection is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that 
offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution 
under this subsection that the actor 
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 
years of age or older at the time of the 
offense or was unaware of the individual's 
true age; nor that the actor mistakenly 
believed that the location where the act 
occurred was not as described in Subsection 
(5)(a) or was unaware that the location where 
the act occurred was as described in 
Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no 
penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit 
any offense unlawful under this chapter is upon 
conviction guilty of one degree less than the maximum 
penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this 
section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any 
civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized 
by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter 
violates a federal law or the law of another 
state, conviction or acquittal under federal 
law or the law of another state for the same 
act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9)(a) When it appears to the court at the time of 
sentencing any person convicted under this chapter that 
the person has previously been convicted of an offense 
under the laws of this state, the United States, or 
another state, which if committed in this state would 
be an offense within this chapter and it appears that 
probation would not be of benefit to the defendant or 
that probation would be contrary to the interest, 
welfare, or protection of society, the court, 
notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if there is 
compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a minimum 
term to be served by the defendant, of up to 1/2 the 
maximum sentence imposed by law for the offense 
committed. For violations of this section, this 
subsection supersedes Section 77-18-4. 
(b)(i) Before any person may be 
sentenced to a minimum term as provided in 
Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, 
or grand jury if an indictment, shall cause 
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to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or 
indictment, in addition to the substantive 
offense charged, a statement setting forth 
the alleged past conviction of the defendant 
and specifically stating the date and place 
of conviction and the offense of which the 
defendant was convicted. The allegation 
shall be presented to the defendant at the 
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by 
leave of court, but in no event later than 
two days prior to the trial of the offense 
charged or the defendant's entering a plea of 
guilty. At the time of arraignment or a 
later date when granted by the court, the 
court shall read the allegation of the 
previous conviction to the defendant, provide 
him or his counsel with a copy of it, and 
explain to the defendant the consequences of 
the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The 
allegation of the past conviction of the 
defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of 
a previous conviction is otherwise recognized 
as admissible by law. 
(ii) The court, following 
conviction of the defendant of the 
substantive offense charged and 
prior to imposing sentence, shall 
inform the defendant of its 
decision to impose a minimum 
sentence under Subsection (9)(a) 
and inquire as to whether the 
defendant admits or denies the 
previous conviction. If the 
defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford 
him an opportunity to present 
evidence showing that the 
allegation of the past conviction 
is erroneous or the conviction was 
lawfully vacated or the defendant 
was pardoned. The evidence shall 
be made a matter of record. 
Following the evidence, the court 
shall make a finding as to whether 
the defendant has a previous 
conviction, which finding is final, 
except for a showing of abuse of 
discretion. Following the 
findings by the court, the 
defendant shall be sentenced under 
Subsection (9)(a) or under the 
appropriate penalty provided by 
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law, as the court in its discretion 
determines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second 
offense to probation who violates that 
probation is subject to Subsections (9)(a) 
and (9) (b) . 
(d) For violations of this section, 
Subsection (9) supersedes Section 76-3-203.5. 
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this 
chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or 
persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, 
or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is 
prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so 
with knowledge of the character of the substance or 
substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a 
veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his 
professional practice only and not for humans, from 
prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled 
substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under his 
direction and supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be 
imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the 
Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, 
distributes, or possesses an imitation 
controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
investigational new drug by a registered 
practitioner in the ordinary course of 
professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting 
in the course and legitimate scope of his 
employment. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the 
application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this 
chapter shall be given effect without the invalid 
provision or application. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, 
for a term at not less than five years, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may 
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a dangerous 
weapon or a facsimile or the representation of a 
dangerous weapon, as provided in Section 76-1-601, was 
used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, 
the court shall additionally sentence the person 
convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively 
and not concurrently; and the court may additionally 
sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, 
for a term at not less than one year nor more than 15 
years but if the trier of fact finds a dangerous weapon 
or a facsimile or the representation of a dangerous 
weapon, as provided in Section 76-1-601, was used in 
the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence 
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, 
for a term not to exceed five years but if the trier of 
fact finds a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the 
representation of a dangerous weapon, as provided in 
Section 76-1-601, was used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony, the court may additionally 
sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous weapon, 
as provided in Section 76-1-601, was used or involved 
in the accomplishment of the felony and is convicted of 
another felony when a dangerous weapon was used or 
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in 
addition to any other sentence imposed, be sentenced 
for an indeterminate term to be not less than five nor 
more than ten years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-204 
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be 
sentenced to imprisonment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a 
term not exceeding one year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a 
term not exceeding six months; 
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a 
term not exceeding ninety days. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-13-6 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any 
time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of 
the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest is made by motion and 
shall be made within 3 0 days after the entry 
of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of 
an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a 
defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the 
defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant 
shall not be required to plead until the defendant has 
had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no 
contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty 
and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the 
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of 
insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a 
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall 
enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the 
consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, 
the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant 
unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court 
shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the 
requirements for making a written demand for a jury 
trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may 
not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented 
by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived 
the right to counsel and does not desire 
counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to 
the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance 
of defense witnesses, and that by entering 
the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which the plea 
is entered, that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum 
sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of 
a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, 
and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of 
the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that 
the right of appeal is limited. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a 
ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the 
ground for extending the time to make a motion under 
Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney 
or any other party has agreed to request or recommend 
the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, 
or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall 
be approved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are 
allowed by the court, the court shall advise 
the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding 
on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea 
discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by 
the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has 
been reached, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure of the 
tentative agreement and the reasons for it, 
in advance of the time for tender of the 
plea. The judge may then indicate to the 
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel 
whether the proposed disposition will be 
approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final 
disposition should not be in conformity with 
the plea agreement, the judge shall advise 
the defendant and then call upon the 
defendant to either affirm or withdraw the 
plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the 
consent of the prosecution, a defendant may 
enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty 
and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in 
the record the right, on appeal from the 
judgment, to a review of the adverse 
determination of any specified pre-trial 
motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal 
shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of 
guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the 
other requirements of this rule, the court 
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time 
to determine if the defendant is mentally ill 
in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 
77-16a-103. 
